Hvorfor er narkotika galt?

[waco]

Er du uimottagelig for noe som helst? Har du ikke lært noen ting av alt som er blitt skrevet til deg her gjennom årene?Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

Du skader mennesker med å politianmelde dem for sine egne valg.

Jeg vet at du ikke behøver å forstå dette her, og det gjør strengt tatt ingenting.

Bare gå rundt å tro du hjelper folk med og politianmelde mennesker.

Som jeg tenker da er at du er voldsomt interessert i å gjøre norge cannabisfritt og narkotika-fritt, - men så viser det seg da at handlekraften din viser bare at du er total maktesløs når det kommer til menneskers personlige valg.

Ble det litt tungt for deg og forstå at du er total maktesløs når det kommer til andre menneskers valg?

Er det derfor du synes det er greit å politianmelde mennesker?

[waco]

Eller jeg må ta det med te-skje.

Å politianmelde ett menneske som bruker cannabis er like hensiktsmessig som å politianmelde en som er tjukk fordi han er tjukk.

Siden du ikke forstår dette her selv så blir jeg nødt til å forklare deg dette her.

Hadde du forandret deg om jeg ameldte deg? Ville en politianmeldelse av deg hatt noen funskjon? Hadde du lært eller hadde du vært uenig?

[AnonymBruker]

Eller jeg må ta det med te-skje.

Å politianmelde ett menneske som bruker cannabis er like hensiktsmessig som å politianmelde en som er tjukk fordi han er tjukk.

Siden du ikke forstår dette her selv så blir jeg nødt til å forklare deg dette her.

Hadde du forandret deg om jeg ameldte deg? Ville en politianmeldelse av deg hatt noen funskjon? Hadde du lært eller hadde du vært uenig?

JEG anmelder ingen, og jeg har heller ingen nullvisjon.

Jeg kommer ikke til å svare deg mer hvis du ikke kan argumentere saklig og la meg selv få lov til å definere hva jeg mener.

Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

[AnonymBruker]

Det var nok heller ikke det som ble skrevet, og de eneste gangene jeg ser slik sirkelargumentasjon, er når noen som forsvarer et forbud blir BESKYLDT for å argumentere slik.

Nedenstående dokument viser derimot hvordan forbudet kom som en konsekvens av at avhengigheten medførte kriminalitet blant brukerne på begynnelsen av 1900-tallet. Inntil da var opiatavhengighet et utelukkende medisinsk problem og brukerne møtte ikke noe stigma. Med nye grupper av brukere som ikke vek tilbake for kriminelle handlinger for å finansiere bruken, ble man nødt til å ilegge forbud.

Forbudet kom altså som en konsekvens - ikke av risikoprofilen - men av vinningskriminalitet knyttet til bruken.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK64157/

Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

Du har tidligere etterspurt nyanserte fremstillinger men her overforenkler du til den store gullmedaljen.

Fahey og Miller skriver følgende i "Alcohol and Drugs in North America: A Historical Encyclopedia" (ABC-CLIO 2013, s.307-8): The growth of heroin use among urban youth, and its connection to the vice and crime of unsavory urban neighborhoods, helped propel the drug's social transformation and spurred the nation's first heroin panic. The emerging stereotype of heroin users was simply more frightening than that of the respectable, middle-aged, female, iatrogenic, morphine addict. Largely drawn from groups of younger men, heroin users seemed willingly engaged in vice. They were often highly visible, idling on public streets, and appeared lower class and criminal. Primarily for these reasons, heroin users were also more likely to end up in prison than were morphine addicts. In addition, officials seized on heroin use to help explain rising urban crime rates alongside a range of emerging social ills in the 1910s and 1920s. These perceptions fueled the notion that heroin users were dangerous and that the drug required stricter regulations than those established by the Harrison Narcotic Act.

En av hovedkildene i de mest relevante avsnittene i dokumentet du linket til er David T. Courtwright. Han skriver i "Dark Paradise: A History of Opiate Addiction in America" (Harvard University Press 2001):

(s.4) As David F. Musto, Arnold H. Taylor, and others have shown, the sequence of events that led up to the passage and interpretation of American narcotic laws was extremely complex. There were diplomatic motives, pressures from special-interest lobbies, constitutional problems, and the ulterior political motives of disingenuous individuals, notably Dr. Hamilton Wright. It would be wrong, therefore, to describe American narcotic policy simply as a function of the changing addict population. Yet there is a sense in which the transformation can be viewed as a necessary condition for the emerging hard-line approach: it would certainly have been more difficult to deny drugs and mete out sentences if, in the 1920s and 1930s, the addict population still had been largely composed of ailing ladies and crippled war veterans.

(s.105) In 1924 Congress, concerned with the youthfulness and alleged violence of heroin addicts and desiring to set an international precedent, effectively outlawed domestic use of the drug; yet even this drastic measure failed to stem the illicit traffic. "In fact," commented Narcotic Inspector Samuel L. Rakusin two years after the heroin ban, "it seems that it is more plentiful at this time than it ever was before."

(s.97-8) Is it appropriate to describe these youthful heroin users as criminals, or as representing a criminal class? The answer is a matter of definition. If by criminal is meant engaging in criminal activities, the answer is a qualified yes. The typical urban street gang of the 1910s and 1920s engaged in a wide range of legal and illegal activities. The same group that would organize a baseball game or a dance one day might be found pilfering boxcars or smashing windows the next. Fighting was an ever-popular activity, and beatings, knifings, and shootings, especially of rival gang members, were common. Most gang members who began using drugs had a history of indulgence in destructive and dangerous pastimes, of which heroin sniffing was merely one manifestation.

(s.143-4) It is possible to distinguish between the characteristics and the behavior of addicts. The characteristics of the addict population were bound to change, given therapeutic reform; attrition in the ranks of older, medical addicts; and continuing recruitment of nonmedical users. The behavior of addicts, however, was very much influenced by the law. Legal changes had a direct or indirect bearing on the type of drug used and the method of administration – from morphine to heroin, from subcutaneous to intravenous injection. They also influenced the amount and type of crime committed by addicts, particularly those who could not secure a legal supply. A daily round of petty theft, drug peddling, or prostitution became the norm. The law did not create the underworld addict, but it did aggravate his behavior.

(s.109) Heroin addiction was originally iatrogenic in nature. Although doctors eventually abandoned their use of the drug, it became popular after 1910 as a euphoric agent. Legal pressures on smoking opium and cocaine were important factors behind this early nonmedical use. Later, when the majority of addicts had been effectively denied access to legal opiates, heroin use spread – principally because it was the opiate most suitable for black market distribution. In addition to a change in the geographic distribution of heroin addicts, there was a change in the method of administration: sniffing gave way to subcutaneous or intramuscular injection, which in turn gave way to intravenous. Sepsis of every imaginable variety, hepatitis, endocarditis, emboli, tetanus, overdose, and early death; these were the consequences of the needle.

(s.144 [s.4]) By 1940 the opiate addict population had undergone a marked transformation: the secretive, female morphine addict had given way to the hustling, mainlining male junkie. Judgement of the emerging nonmedical majority was harsh. [What we think about addiction very much depends on who is addicted.] More tolerant views had prevailed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but these were abandoned as the pattern of addiction shifted. The government's antimaintenance policy succeeded in making a bad situation worse: criminal activity was at least in part a function of black market prices.

Anonymous poster hash: 75829...8f4

[Kreps1]

Vi vet ingen ting om langtidsutvikling i brukerkultur i et legalt marked. Jeg synes fortsatt du mangler nyanser i analysen din. Vi ser forøvrig allerede nå store grupper som KOMBINERER alkohol og cannabis. Det er ikke et enten/eller-spørsmål.

Jeg tror begreper som "galt", "riktig", og "sunnere" bidrar til å gjøre debatten veldig mye vanskeligere enn den behøver å være.

Går det ikke an å diskutere dette uten å måtte tillegge andre holdninger og meninger om strafferettslige skritt? Straff, sanksjoner og presedens for dette er egentlig en helt annen diskusjon en selve diskusjonen om legalstatus.

Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

Beklager, burde brukt begrepet "mindre skadelig".

Ellers er jeg enig at debatten ofte polariseres og at det er lite nyanser og se. Personlig syns jeg debatten og informasjonen i flere tiår har vært veldig uanyansert. Er det én ting Kari og Ola Nordmann avskyr, og samtidig har minimalt med kunnskaper om, er det narkotika.

[AnonymBruker]

Du har tidligere etterspurt nyanserte fremstillinger men her overforenkler du til den store gullmedaljen.Fahey og Miller skriver følgende i "Alcohol and Drugs in North America: A Historical Encyclopedia" (ABC-CLIO 2013, s.307-8): The growth of heroin use among urban youth, and its connection to the vice and crime of unsavory urban neighborhoods, helped propel the drug's social transformation and spurred the nation's first heroin panic. The emerging stereotype of heroin users was simply more frightening than that of the respectable, middle-aged, female, iatrogenic, morphine addict. Largely drawn from groups of younger men, heroin users seemed willingly engaged in vice. They were often highly visible, idling on public streets, and appeared lower class and criminal. Primarily for these reasons, heroin users were also more likely to end up in prison than were morphine addicts. In addition, officials seized on heroin use to help explain rising urban crime rates alongside a range of emerging social ills in the 1910s and 1920s. These perceptions fueled the notion that heroin users were dangerous and that the drug required stricter regulations than those established by the Harrison Narcotic Act.En av hovedkildene i de mest relevante avsnittene i dokumentet du linket til er David T. Courtwright. Han skriver i "Dark Paradise: A History of Opiate Addiction in America" (Harvard University Press 2001):(s.4) As David F. Musto, Arnold H. Taylor, and others have shown, the sequence of events that led up to the passage and interpretation of American narcotic laws was extremely complex. There were diplomatic motives, pressures from special-interest lobbies, constitutional problems, and the ulterior political motives of disingenuous individuals, notably Dr. Hamilton Wright. It would be wrong, therefore, to describe American narcotic policy simply as a function of the changing addict population. Yet there is a sense in which the transformation can be viewed as a necessary condition for the emerging hard-line approach: it would certainly have been more difficult to deny drugs and mete out sentences if, in the 1920s and 1930s, the addict population still had been largely composed of ailing ladies and crippled war veterans.(s.105) In 1924 Congress, concerned with the youthfulness and alleged violence of heroin addicts and desiring to set an international precedent, effectively outlawed domestic use of the drug; yet even this drastic measure failed to stem the illicit traffic. "In fact," commented Narcotic Inspector Samuel L. Rakusin two years after the heroin ban, "it seems that it is more plentiful at this time than it ever was before."(s.97-8) Is it appropriate to describe these youthful heroin users as criminals, or as representing a criminal class? The answer is a matter of definition. If by criminal is meant engaging in criminal activities, the answer is a qualified yes. The typical urban street gang of the 1910s and 1920s engaged in a wide range of legal and illegal activities. The same group that would organize a baseball game or a dance one day might be found pilfering boxcars or smashing windows the next. Fighting was an ever-popular activity, and beatings, knifings, and shootings, especially of rival gang members, were common. Most gang members who began using drugs had a history of indulgence in destructive and dangerous pastimes, of which heroin sniffing was merely one manifestation.(s.143-4) It is possible to distinguish between the characteristics and the behavior of addicts. The characteristics of the addict population were bound to change, given therapeutic reform; attrition in the ranks of older, medical addicts; and continuing recruitment of nonmedical users. The behavior of addicts, however, was very much influenced by the law. Legal changes had a direct or indirect bearing on the type of drug used and the method of administration – from morphine to heroin, from subcutaneous to intravenous injection. They also influenced the amount and type of crime committed by addicts, particularly those who could not secure a legal supply. A daily round of petty theft, drug peddling, or prostitution became the norm. The law did not create the underworld addict, but it did aggravate his behavior.(s.109) Heroin addiction was originally iatrogenic in nature. Although doctors eventually abandoned their use of the drug, it became popular after 1910 as a euphoric agent. Legal pressures on smoking opium and cocaine were important factors behind this early nonmedical use. Later, when the majority of addicts had been effectively denied access to legal opiates, heroin use spread – principally because it was the opiate most suitable for black market distribution. In addition to a change in the geographic distribution of heroin addicts, there was a change in the method of administration: sniffing gave way to subcutaneous or intramuscular injection, which in turn gave way to intravenous. Sepsis of every imaginable variety, hepatitis, endocarditis, emboli, tetanus, overdose, and early death; these were the consequences of the needle.(s.144 [s.4]) By 1940 the opiate addict population had undergone a marked transformation: the secretive, female morphine addict had given way to the hustling, mainlining male junkie. Judgement of the emerging nonmedical majority was harsh. [What we think about addiction very much depends on who is addicted.] More tolerant views had prevailed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but these were abandoned as the pattern of addiction shifted. The government's antimaintenance policy succeeded in making a bad situation worse: criminal activity was at least in part a function of black market prices. Anonymous poster hash: 75829...8f4

Jeg ser vel ikke helt hvordan dette står i kontrast til hva jeg skrev....?

Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

[AnonymBruker]

Beklager, burde brukt begrepet "mindre skadelig".

Ellers er jeg enig at debatten ofte polariseres og at det er lite nyanser og se. Personlig syns jeg debatten og informasjonen i flere tiår har vært veldig uanyansert. Er det én ting Kari og Ola Nordmann avskyr, og samtidig har minimalt med kunnskaper om, er det narkotika.

Bortsett fra at vi står på hver vår side hva gjelder konklusjonen, er vi nok ikke så svært uenige i mange av tankeprosessene underveis.

Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

[waco]

Jeg ser vel ikke helt hvordan dette står i kontrast til hva jeg skrev....?Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

Eeh, dersom du leste teksten så ville du lest at narkotikaforbudet forverret samfunnet.

[waco]

Bortsett fra at vi står på hver vår side hva gjelder konklusjonen, er vi nok ikke så svært uenige i mange av tankeprosessene underveis.Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

En viktig forskjell er at krepsen mener at det blir opptil hver enkelt å avgjøre om man skal bruke narkotika, mens du foretrekker at mennesker som bruker narkotika blir straffet.

Årsaken til at du ønsker at mennesker som bruker narkotika skal bli straffer et fordi du er for et forbud.

I valget mellom å være for et narkotikaforbud og narkotikastraffer og det å være imot narkotstraffer valgte du å være for straff.

Derfor mener jeg at du tar feil og krepsen har rett.

[AnonymBruker]

En viktig forskjell er at krepsen mener at det blir opptil hver enkelt å avgjøre om man skal bruke narkotika, mens du foretrekker at mennesker som bruker narkotika blir straffet.

Årsaken til at du ønsker at mennesker som bruker narkotika skal bli straffer et fordi du er for et forbud.

I valget mellom å være for et narkotikaforbud og narkotikastraffer og det å være imot narkotstraffer valgte du å være for straff.

Derfor mener jeg at du tar feil og krepsen har rett.

Dette handker ikke om å ha rett eller ta feil, men om å forsøke å finne løsninger.

Din sorthvitt-tenkning fører ikke til noe annet enn at folk blir irritert på deg.

Når skal du lære deg å diskutere skikkelig?

Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

[waco]

Dette handker ikke om å ha rett eller ta feil, men om å forsøke å finne løsninger.

Din sorthvitt-tenkning fører ikke til noe annet enn at folk blir irritert på deg.

Når skal du lære deg å diskutere skikkelig?Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

Jeg diskuterer skikkelig jeg. Jeg har tatt et høyt og stolt standpunkt mot straff.

Eller for å si det sånn, jeg er like mye imot narkotika-bruk som jeg er til straffbruk.

Så lenge det finnes mennesker som ikke tar den fullstendige avstand fra straff når man ønsker å forby narkotika, - nei da har jeg enda min misjon.

En dag så vil du også bli voksen og opplyst. Da vil du forhåpentligvis forstå at å straffe mennesker fordi en velger å bruke narkotika er galt. Si heller nei til straff enn narkotikabruk.

Du vet vel selv at det er bevist at straff ikke fungerer?

[AnonymBruker]

Jeg diskuterer skikkelig jeg. Jeg har tatt et høyt og stolt standpunkt mot straff.

Nei, du definerer hva motstanderne dine mener, og legger ord, meninger, holdninger og handlinger på dem som de ikke nødvendigvis har eller identifiserer seg med. Dermed blir diskusjoner med deg bare tull. Du virker også ute av stand til å lære av erfaringer, men messer om det samme år etter år etter år, selv om svakhetene i argumentasjonen din er blitt påpekt ofte og mye.

Hadde jeg ikke kjent faren din, og dermed visst at du faktisk finnes, ville jeg trodd du var en konstruksjon, og ikke et virkelig menneske.

Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

[waco]

Nei, du definerer hva motstanderne dine mener, og legger ord, meninger, holdninger og handlinger på dem som de ikke nødvendigvis har eller identifiserer seg med. Dermed blir diskusjoner med deg bare tull. Du virker også ute av stand til å lære av erfaringer, men messer om det samme år etter år etter år, selv om svakhetene i argumentasjonen din er blitt påpekt ofte og mye.

Hadde jeg ikke kjent faren din, og dermed visst at du faktisk finnes, ville jeg trodd du var en konstruksjon, og ikke et virkelig menneske.Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

Konstruksjon? Et virkelig menneske? Unnskyld meg, men forstår du ikke selv at straff er galt mot narkomani?

Straff er jo galt mot hekser? Straff er jo galt mot sykdom? Straff er jo galt mot overvekt?

Straff er til og med galt mot abort! Skjønte du den? Abort var forbudt i norge frem til 1978 som gjorde det straffbart og ha selvbestemt abort!

Forstår du ikke selv at straff er galt mot narkotika? Straff er galt mot alkoholisme? Straff er galt mot overvekt? Straff er galt mot bulimi og spiseforstyrrelser.

Straff er galt!

Men som sagt tusen ganger før, - du behøver ikke å forstå dette her. Kanskje straffen er viktig for deg for å forhindre deg i å ta egne valg?

Ikkesant?

[waco]

JEG anmelder ingen, og jeg har heller ingen nullvisjon.

Jeg kommer ikke til å svare deg mer hvis du ikke kan argumentere saklig og la meg selv få lov til å definere hva jeg mener.Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

Da spør jeg deg for tusen gang, - er DU for at det skal være lov å politianmelde en som bruker narkotika eller er DU imot at det skal være lov å anmelde en som bruker narkotika?

Greia er at du må svare. Du er jo den feigeste på hele forumet her. Når jeg spør deg hvorfor du er for at du skal få straff for å bruker narkotika så svarer du at de ikke er for din egen skyld!

Du snakker ikke for deg selv en gang, er det rart det er vanskelig å ta de seriøst? Å høre på tøysemeninger til en som ikke selv tør innrømme hva en står for?

Jeg spør deg og bare deg, - synes DU det skal være lov å anmelde ett menneske for å bruker narkotika så er det ett ja eller nei svar.

At du ikke svarer ordentlig, - men kommer med masse vissvass om at du ikke har juss-kunnskaper, men det er ikke det jeg spør om?

Hvorfor er du så redd for å svare ordentlig? Er du redd det skal bli brukt mot deg? Er du redd for at jeg skal avsløre deg?

Jeg skjønner ikke hvorfor du ikke klarer å ta avstand fra straffelyst for bruk av narkotika?

Er det veldig vanskelig å avvenne deg, - er de derfor du er for straff av mennesker som bruker narkotika?

[AnonymBruker]

Jeg ser vel ikke helt hvordan dette står i kontrast til hva jeg skrev....?

Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

Er du seriøs? Du ser ikke hvordan påstanden "forbudet kom som en konsekvens av vinningskriminalitet knyttet til bruken" står i negativ kontrast til "the sequence of events that led up to the passage and interpretation of American narcotic laws was extremely complex" og "it would be wrong to describe American narcotic policy simply as a function of the changing addict population"?

Kildene i de relevante avsnittene i dokumentet du linket til er Edward M. Brecher ("Licit and Illicit Drugs", Little, Brown 1972) og tidligere nevnte Courtwright. Jeg finner ikke noe hos noen av dem som tyder på at "vinningskriminalitet for å skaffe penger til heroin" var noe problem før Harrison-loven ble innført.

Courtwright poengterer tvertimot flere ganger at heroinet var billig – "heroin, which was cheap, was an attractive alternative to smoking opium" (s.93); "heroin was doubly attractive to cocaine users: it was cheap, and it was taken in the accustomed fashion, sniffing." (s.96)

Brecher påpeker at "it is not heroin addiction but the limited availbility and high cost of black-market heroin which leads to antisocial behavior among heroin addicts." (s.395)

Denne "vinningskriminaliteten knyttet til bruken" blir altså først markant ETTER at lovene har trådd i kraft, når prisene på det svarte markedet eskalerer samtidig som heroinet blir mer og mer utblandet.

Pearce Bailey skriver i "The Heroin Habit", New Republic Vol.6 1916: "Once the Harrison law was established the price of heroin soared. From costing before this $0.85 a drachm, its retail illicit price has been raised to $7.50 a drachm – and it is adulterated at that. This put it beyond easy reach of the majority of its adherents, most of whom do not earn more than $12-14 a week."

Courtwright: "Legal changes influenced the amount and type of crime committed by addicts, particularly those who could not secure a legal supply. A daily round of petty theft, drug peddling, or prostitution became the norm. The law did not create the underworld addict, but it did aggravate his behavior. The government's antimaintenance policy succeeded in making a bad situation worse: criminal activity was at least in part a function of black market prices." (s.144)

Brecher: "The fact is that the use of legal provisions has not made heroin unavailable or even difficult to secure. The main accomplishment of law enforcement has been to raise black-market prices." (s.103)

Brecher siterer en rekke personligheter som er sterkt kritiske til forbudslinjen, deriblant en pensjonert politisjef, Agust Vollmer, som i 1936 skriver at "stringent laws, spectacular police drives, vigorous prosecution, and imprisonment of addicts and peddlers have proved not only useless and enormously expensive as means of correcting this evil, but they are also unjustifiably and unbelievably cruel in their application to the unfortunate drug victims. Not the least of the evils associated with repression, the helpless addict has been forced to resort to crime in order to get money for the drug which is absolutely indispensable for his comfortable existence." (s.92-3)

Hvis "vinningskriminalitet knyttet til bruken" var så avgjørende som du fremstiller det, hvorfor ble ikke forbudet avviklet når man så at det tvertimot medførte en kraftig økning i slik småkriminalitet?

Anonymous poster hash: 75829...8f4

[AnonymBruker]

Da spør jeg deg for tusen gang, - er DU for at det skal være lov å politianmelde en som bruker narkotika eller er DU imot at det skal være lov å anmelde en som bruker narkotika?

Greia er at du må svare. Du er jo den feigeste på hele forumet her. Når jeg spør deg hvorfor du er for at du skal få straff for å bruker narkotika så svarer du at de ikke er for din egen skyld!

Du snakker ikke for deg selv en gang, er det rart det er vanskelig å ta de seriøst? Å høre på tøysemeninger til en som ikke selv tør innrømme hva en står for?

Jeg spør deg og bare deg, - synes DU det skal være lov å anmelde ett menneske for å bruker narkotika så er det ett ja eller nei svar.

At du ikke svarer ordentlig, - men kommer med masse vissvass om at du ikke har juss-kunnskaper, men det er ikke det jeg spør om?

Hvorfor er du så redd for å svare ordentlig? Er du redd det skal bli brukt mot deg? Er du redd for at jeg skal avsløre deg?

Jeg skjønner ikke hvorfor du ikke klarer å ta avstand fra straffelyst for bruk av narkotika?

Er det veldig vanskelig å avvenne deg, - er de derfor du er for straff av mennesker som bruker narkotika?

Jeg gidder ikke det monomane pjattet ditt. Du er kunnskapsløs, og prøver alltid å diskutere noe helt annet enn det man snakker om.

Du stiller spørsmålene helt galt, og klarer ikke å forholde deg saklig. Hvis du begynner å diskutere uten å forhåndsdefinere hva jeg mener uten hensyn til hva jeg tenker om den saken, kunne det kanskje hjelpe litt, men jeg tror ikke det går an å få til noen ordentlig meningsutveksling med deg.

Er du seriøs? Du ser ikke hvordan påstanden "forbudet kom som en konsekvens av vinningskriminalitet knyttet til bruken" står i negativ kontrast til "the sequence of events that led up to the passage and interpretation of American narcotic laws was extremely complex" og "it would be wrong to describe American narcotic policy simply as a function of the changing addict population"?Kildene i de relevante avsnittene i dokumentet du linket til er Edward M. Brecher ("Licit and Illicit Drugs", Little, Brown 1972) og tidligere nevnte Courtwright. Jeg finner ikke noe hos noen av dem som tyder på at "vinningskriminalitet for å skaffe penger til heroin" var noe problem før Harrison-loven ble innført.Courtwright poengterer tvertimot flere ganger at heroinet var billig – "heroin, which was cheap, was an attractive alternative to smoking opium" (s.93); "heroin was doubly attractive to cocaine users: it was cheap, and it was taken in the accustomed fashion, sniffing." (s.96)Brecher påpeker at "it is not heroin addiction but the limited availbility and high cost of black-market heroin which leads to antisocial behavior among heroin addicts." (s.395)Denne "vinningskriminaliteten knyttet til bruken" blir altså først markant ETTER at lovene har trådd i kraft, når prisene på det svarte markedet eskalerer samtidig som heroinet blir mer og mer utblandet.Pearce Bailey skriver i "The Heroin Habit", New Republic Vol.6 1916: "Once the Harrison law was established the price of heroin soared. From costing before this $0.85 a drachm, its retail illicit price has been raised to $7.50 a drachm – and it is adulterated at that. This put it beyond easy reach of the majority of its adherents, most of whom do not earn more than $12-14 a week."Courtwright: "Legal changes influenced the amount and type of crime committed by addicts, particularly those who could not secure a legal supply. A daily round of petty theft, drug peddling, or prostitution became the norm. The law did not create the underworld addict, but it did aggravate his behavior. The government's antimaintenance policy succeeded in making a bad situation worse: criminal activity was at least in part a function of black market prices." (s.144)Brecher: "The fact is that the use of legal provisions has not made heroin unavailable or even difficult to secure. The main accomplishment of law enforcement has been to raise black-market prices." (s.103)Brecher siterer en rekke personligheter som er sterkt kritiske til forbudslinjen, deriblant en pensjonert politisjef, Agust Vollmer, som i 1936 skriver at "stringent laws, spectacular police drives, vigorous prosecution, and imprisonment of addicts and peddlers have proved not only useless and enormously expensive as means of correcting this evil, but they are also unjustifiably and unbelievably cruel in their application to the unfortunate drug victims. Not the least of the evils associated with repression, the helpless addict has been forced to resort to crime in order to get money for the drug which is absolutely indispensable for his comfortable existence." (s.92-3)Hvis "vinningskriminalitet knyttet til bruken" var så avgjørende som du fremstiller det, hvorfor ble ikke forbudet avviklet når man så at det tvertimot medførte en kraftig økning i slik småkriminalitet? Anonymous poster hash: 75829...8f4

Det du linker til beskriver hvordan det ikke var behov for noen særskilt lovgivning da opiatproblemene var et forskrivningsproblem, men at dette endret seg da misbruket tiltok i nye befolkningsgrupper som ikke gikk av veien for kriminalitet for å tilfredsstille vanen sin.

Det er nøyaktig det jeg beskrev for deg.

Jeg har aldri benektet at det var komplekse grunner til forbudet, men dette er et svært vesentlig aspekt. I den tiden morfinisme kun var et medisinsk, og ikke et sosialt problem hadde man heller ikke noe behov for å implementere dette i straffeloven.

Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

[AnonymBruker]

Det du linker til beskriver hvordan det ikke var behov for noen særskilt lovgivning da opiatproblemene var et forskrivningsproblem, men at dette endret seg da misbruket tiltok i nye befolkningsgrupper som ikke gikk av veien for kriminalitet for å tilfredsstille vanen sin.

Det er nøyaktig det jeg beskrev for deg.

Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

Du beskrev ingenting, du påstod at "forbudet kom som en konsekvens av at avhengigheten medførte kriminalitet blant brukerne på begynnelsen av 1900-tallet – med nye grupper av brukere som ikke vek tilbake for kriminelle handlinger for å finansiere bruken, ble man nødt til å ilegge forbud." Du linket til et dokument som påstår noe av det samme, basert på to kilder. Men jeg klarer som sagt ikke å finne dekning for denne påstanden hos noen av kildene.

Jeg har aldri benektet at det var komplekse grunner til forbudet, men dette er et svært vesentlig aspekt.

Kan du dokumentere dette med en historisk kilde?

Hvis "vinningskriminalitet knyttet til bruken" var så avgjørende som du fremstiller det, hvorfor ble ikke forbudet avviklet når man så at det tvertimot medførte en kraftig økning i slik småkriminalitet?

Her er for øvrig hva Brecher sier om saken. Du kan jo se om du finner noe om vinningskriminalitet der:

Through most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the antialcohol forces in the United States were gaining ground. The anti-opiate forces, in contrast, remained weak and poorly organized. Why, then, did opiate prohibition precede alcohol prohibition by five years?

After the Spanish-American War, when the United States War Department took over the chore of governing the Philippine Islands, it inherited a whole system for licensing narcotics addicts and supplying them with opium legally-a system established under Spanish rule. A War Department Commission of Inquiry was appointed under the Right Reverend Charles H. Brent, Episcopal Bishop of the Philippine Islands, to study alternatives to the Spanish system. After taking evidence on programs of narcotics control throughout the Far East, the Brent Commission recommended that narcotics should be subject to international rather than merely national control.

This proposal struck a responsive chord in the United States State Department. For many years, Britain had been criticized for shipping opium grown in India into China; indeed, two nineteenth-century "opium wars" between Britain and China had been fought over this issue. Many Chinese saw opium from India as unfair cut-rate competition for their home-grown product. American missionaries in China complained that British opium was ruining the Chinese people; American traders similarly complained that the silver bullion China was trading for British opium could better be traded for other, perhaps American, products. The agitation against British opium sales to China continued unabated after 1900. Thus the United States State Department saw a way not only to solve the War Department's Philippine opium problem but also to please American missionaries and traders. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1906, at the request of Bishop Brent, called for an international opium conference, which was held in Shanghai in 1909. A second conference was held at The Hague in 1911, and out of it came the first international opium agreement, The Hague Convention of 1912, aimed primarily at solving the opium problems of the Far East, especially China.

It was against this background that the Senate in 1914 considered the Harrison narcotic bill. The chief proponent of the measure was Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, a man of deep prohibitionist and missionary convictions and sympathies. He urged that the law be promptly passed to fulfill United States obligations under the new international treaty.

The supporters of the Harrison bill said little in the Congressional debates (which lasted several days) about the evils of narcotics addiction in the United States. They talked more about the need to implement The Hague Convention of 1912. Even Senator Mann of Mann Act fame, spokesman for the bill in the Senate, talked about international obligations rather than domestic morality.

On its face, moreover, the Harrison bill did not appear to be a prohibition law at all. Its official title was "An Act to provide for the registration of, with collectors of internal revenue, and to impose a special tax upon all persons who produce, import, manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute, or give away opium or coca leaves, their salts, derivatives, or preparations, and for other purposes." The law specifically provided that manufacturers, importers, pharmacists, and physicians prescribing narcotics should be licensed to do so, at a moderate fee. The patent-medicine manufacturers were exempted even from the licensing and tax provisions, provided that they limited themselves to "preparations and remedies which do not contain more than two grains of opium, or more than one-fourth of a grain of morphine, or more than one-eighth of a grain of heroin in one avoirdupois ounce." Far from appearing to be a prohibition law, the Harrison Narcotic Act on its face was merely a law for the orderly marketing of opium, morphine, heroin, end other drugs-in small quantities over the counter, and in larger Quantities on a physician's prescription. Indeed, the right of a physician to prescribe was spelled out in apparently unambiguous terms: "Nothing contained in this section shall apply … to the dispensing or distribution of any of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by a physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered under this Act in the course of his professional practice only." Registered physicians were required only to keep records of drugs dispensed or prescribed. it is unlikely that a single legislator realized in 1914 that the law Congress was passing would later be decreed a prohibition law.

The provision protecting physicians, however, contained a joker hidden in the phrase, "in the course of his professional practice only." After passage of the law, this clause was interpreted by law-enforcement officers to mean that a doctor could not prescribe opiates to an addict to maintain his addiction. Since addiction was not a disease, the argument went, an addict was not a patient, and opiates dispensed to or prescribed for him by a physician were therefore not being supplied "in the course of his professional practice." Thus a law apparently intended to ensure the orderly marketing of narcotics was converted into a law prohibiting the supplying of narcotics to addicts, even on a physician's prescription.

Many physicians were arrested under this interpretation, and some were convicted and imprisoned. Even those who escaped conviction had their careers ruined by the publicity. The medical profession quickly learned that to supply opiates to addicts was to court disaster.

In 1918, after three years of the Harrison Act and its devastating effects, the secretary of the treasury appointed a committee to look into the problem. The chairman of the committee was Congressman Homer T. Rainey; members included a professor of pharmacology from Harvard, a former deputy commissioner of internal revenue responsible for law enforcement, and Dr. A. G. Du Mez, Secretary of the United States Public Health Service. This was the first of a long line of such committees appointed through the years. Among its findings were the following:

– Opium and other narcotic drugs (including cocaine, which Congress had erroneously labeled as a narcotic in 1914) were being used by about a million people. (This was almost certainly an overestimate; see Chapter 9.)

– The "underground" traffic in narcotic drugs was about equal to the legitimate medical traffic.

– The "dope peddlers" appeared to have established a national organization, smuggling the drugs in through seaports or across the Canadian or Mexican borders-especially the Canadian border.

– The wrongful use of narcotic drugs had increased since passage of the Harrison Act. Twenty cities, including New York and San Francisco, had reported such increases. (The increase no doubt resulted from the migration of addicts into cities where black markets flourished.)

To stem this apparently rising tide, the 1918 committee, like countless committees since, called for sterner law enforcement. it also recommended more state laws patterned after the Harrison Act.

Congress responded by tightening up the Harrison Act. In 1924, for example, a law was enacted prohibiting the importation of heroin altogether, even for medicinal use. This legislation grew out of the widespread misapprehension that, because of the deteriorating health, behavior, and status of addicts following passage of the Harrison Act and the subsequent conversion of addicts from morphine to heroin, heroin must be a much more damaging drug than opium or morphine. In 1925, Dr. Lawrence Kolb reported on a study of both morphine and heroin addiction: "If there is any difference in the deteriorating effects of morphine and heroin on addicts, it is too slight to be determined clinically." President Johnson's Committee on Law Enforcement and Administration of justice came to the same conclusion in 1967: "While it is somewhat more rapid in its action, heroin does not differ in any significant pharmacological effect from morphine."

The 1924 ban on heroin did not deter the conversion of morphine addicts to heroin. On the contrary, heroin ousted morphine almost completely from the black market AFTER the law was passed.

Anonymous poster hash: 75829...8f4

[AnonymBruker]

Du beskrev ingenting, du påstod at "forbudet kom som en konsekvens av at avhengigheten medførte kriminalitet blant brukerne på begynnelsen av 1900-tallet – med nye grupper av brukere som ikke vek tilbake for kriminelle handlinger for å finansiere bruken, ble man nødt til å ilegge forbud." Du linket til et dokument som påstår noe av det samme, basert på to kilder. Men jeg klarer som sagt ikke å finne dekning for denne påstanden hos noen av kildene. Kan du dokumentere dette med en historisk kilde?Hvis "vinningskriminalitet knyttet til bruken" var så avgjørende som du fremstiller det, hvorfor ble ikke forbudet avviklet når man så at det tvertimot medførte en kraftig økning i slik småkriminalitet?Her er for øvrig hva Brecher sier om saken. Du kan jo se om du finner noe om vinningskriminalitet der: Through most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the antialcohol forces in the United States were gaining ground. The anti-opiate forces, in contrast, remained weak and poorly organized. Why, then, did opiate prohibition precede alcohol prohibition by five years?After the Spanish-American War, when the United States War Department took over the chore of governing the Philippine Islands, it inherited a whole system for licensing narcotics addicts and supplying them with opium legally-a system established under Spanish rule. A War Department Commission of Inquiry was appointed under the Right Reverend Charles H. Brent, Episcopal Bishop of the Philippine Islands, to study alternatives to the Spanish system. After taking evidence on programs of narcotics control throughout the Far East, the Brent Commission recommended that narcotics should be subject to international rather than merely national control.This proposal struck a responsive chord in the United States State Department. For many years, Britain had been criticized for shipping opium grown in India into China; indeed, two nineteenth-century "opium wars" between Britain and China had been fought over this issue. Many Chinese saw opium from India as unfair cut-rate competition for their home-grown product. American missionaries in China complained that British opium was ruining the Chinese people; American traders similarly complained that the silver bullion China was trading for British opium could better be traded for other, perhaps American, products. The agitation against British opium sales to China continued unabated after 1900. Thus the United States State Department saw a way not only to solve the War Department's Philippine opium problem but also to please American missionaries and traders. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1906, at the request of Bishop Brent, called for an international opium conference, which was held in Shanghai in 1909. A second conference was held at The Hague in 1911, and out of it came the first international opium agreement, The Hague Convention of 1912, aimed primarily at solving the opium problems of the Far East, especially China.It was against this background that the Senate in 1914 considered the Harrison narcotic bill. The chief proponent of the measure was Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, a man of deep prohibitionist and missionary convictions and sympathies. He urged that the law be promptly passed to fulfill United States obligations under the new international treaty.The supporters of the Harrison bill said little in the Congressional debates (which lasted several days) about the evils of narcotics addiction in the United States. They talked more about the need to implement The Hague Convention of 1912. Even Senator Mann of Mann Act fame, spokesman for the bill in the Senate, talked about international obligations rather than domestic morality.On its face, moreover, the Harrison bill did not appear to be a prohibition law at all. Its official title was "An Act to provide for the registration of, with collectors of internal revenue, and to impose a special tax upon all persons who produce, import, manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute, or give away opium or coca leaves, their salts, derivatives, or preparations, and for other purposes." The law specifically provided that manufacturers, importers, pharmacists, and physicians prescribing narcotics should be licensed to do so, at a moderate fee. The patent-medicine manufacturers were exempted even from the licensing and tax provisions, provided that they limited themselves to "preparations and remedies which do not contain more than two grains of opium, or more than one-fourth of a grain of morphine, or more than one-eighth of a grain of heroin in one avoirdupois ounce." Far from appearing to be a prohibition law, the Harrison Narcotic Act on its face was merely a law for the orderly marketing of opium, morphine, heroin, end other drugs-in small quantities over the counter, and in larger Quantities on a physician's prescription. Indeed, the right of a physician to prescribe was spelled out in apparently unambiguous terms: "Nothing contained in this section shall apply … to the dispensing or distribution of any of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by a physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered under this Act in the course of his professional practice only." Registered physicians were required only to keep records of drugs dispensed or prescribed. it is unlikely that a single legislator realized in 1914 that the law Congress was passing would later be decreed a prohibition law.The provision protecting physicians, however, contained a joker hidden in the phrase, "in the course of his professional practice only." After passage of the law, this clause was interpreted by law-enforcement officers to mean that a doctor could not prescribe opiates to an addict to maintain his addiction. Since addiction was not a disease, the argument went, an addict was not a patient, and opiates dispensed to or prescribed for him by a physician were therefore not being supplied "in the course of his professional practice." Thus a law apparently intended to ensure the orderly marketing of narcotics was converted into a law prohibiting the supplying of narcotics to addicts, even on a physician's prescription.Many physicians were arrested under this interpretation, and some were convicted and imprisoned. Even those who escaped conviction had their careers ruined by the publicity. The medical profession quickly learned that to supply opiates to addicts was to court disaster.In 1918, after three years of the Harrison Act and its devastating effects, the secretary of the treasury appointed a committee to look into the problem. The chairman of the committee was Congressman Homer T. Rainey; members included a professor of pharmacology from Harvard, a former deputy commissioner of internal revenue responsible for law enforcement, and Dr. A. G. Du Mez, Secretary of the United States Public Health Service. This was the first of a long line of such committees appointed through the years. Among its findings were the following:– Opium and other narcotic drugs (including cocaine, which Congress had erroneously labeled as a narcotic in 1914) were being used by about a million people. (This was almost certainly an overestimate; see Chapter 9.)– The "underground" traffic in narcotic drugs was about equal to the legitimate medical traffic.– The "dope peddlers" appeared to have established a national organization, smuggling the drugs in through seaports or across the Canadian or Mexican borders-especially the Canadian border.– The wrongful use of narcotic drugs had increased since passage of the Harrison Act. Twenty cities, including New York and San Francisco, had reported such increases. (The increase no doubt resulted from the migration of addicts into cities where black markets flourished.)To stem this apparently rising tide, the 1918 committee, like countless committees since, called for sterner law enforcement. it also recommended more state laws patterned after the Harrison Act.Congress responded by tightening up the Harrison Act. In 1924, for example, a law was enacted prohibiting the importation of heroin altogether, even for medicinal use. This legislation grew out of the widespread misapprehension that, because of the deteriorating health, behavior, and status of addicts following passage of the Harrison Act and the subsequent conversion of addicts from morphine to heroin, heroin must be a much more damaging drug than opium or morphine. In 1925, Dr. Lawrence Kolb reported on a study of both morphine and heroin addiction: "If there is any difference in the deteriorating effects of morphine and heroin on addicts, it is too slight to be determined clinically." President Johnson's Committee on Law Enforcement and Administration of justice came to the same conclusion in 1967: "While it is somewhat more rapid in its action, heroin does not differ in any significant pharmacological effect from morphine."The 1924 ban on heroin did not deter the conversion of morphine addicts to heroin. On the contrary, heroin ousted morphine almost completely from the black market AFTER the law was passed. Anonymous poster hash: 75829...8f4

Du har lest litt selektivt hva jeg faktisk skrev, men det gidder jeg ikke å krangle med deg om. Man kan diskutere seg blå på kontrefaktisk historieskrivning, men jeg tviler på at et tilsvarende forbud ville ha kommet om man ikke hadde sett en dreining fra en mer eller mindre legestyrt pasientgruppe som var morfinavhengige til en gruppe misbrukere som ikke sprang ut av medisinsk behandling.

Det virker som om du vinkler dette litt i forhold til din påstand om at forbudet skaper flere problemer enn det løser. Dette er bare sant hvis man ikke innrømmer folk et valg i å innta giftstoffer eller ikke - men det har nok hatt uheldige konsekvenser for et behandlingsforløp. Det er ikke så vanskelig å se nettopp det aspektet, men det avspeiler mer at man hadde begrenset kunnskap enn noen ondsinnet politisk vilje.

At antall misbrukere økte (eller muligens bare ble mer synlige) etter forbudet er ikke noe bevis på noe som helst annet enn at de aktuelle stoffene er avhengighetsskapende.

Det er i våre dager et vanlig og akseptert prinsipp at almenfarlige stoffer reguleres i form av forbud eller begrenset tilgjengelighet, og det gjelder like mye for eksplosiver og giftstoffer som for rusmidler og legemidler som ikke gir rus. Hvorfor skal rusmidler være i en særstilling her?

Man kan heller diskutere hvordan man skal forholde seg til de som HAR opparbeidet seg et rusproblem, i stedet for å legge til rette for at alle skal kunne gjøre det.

Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

[AnonymBruker]

Du har lest litt selektivt hva jeg faktisk skrev, men det gidder jeg ikke å krangle med deg om.

Anonymous poster hash: 8cc46...339

Jeg leste nøyaktig hva du faktisk skrev, og reagerte på akkurat det. Hadde du formulert deg som i den modererte versjonen du postet nå, så hadde vi vært enige i utgangspunktet.

Det virker som om du vinkler dette litt i forhold til din påstand om at forbudet skaper flere problemer enn det løser.

Jeg refererer bare fra de to kildene i dokumentet du linket til, vinklingen er deres. Jeg er naturligvis helt enig med dem, men det var ikke jeg som valgte disse kildene.

Dette er bare sant hvis man ikke innrømmer folk et valg i å innta giftstoffer eller ikke

Jeg vil gjerne gi folk et slikt valg, jeg. Er man myndig så må man selv få kunne bestemme hvorvidt man vil ruse seg.

Nei, jeg skjønner vel hva du mener, men jeg ser det bare ikke som noe stort poeng. Forbudet får jo tydeligvis ikke disse menneskene til å velge annerledes likevel, og det påfører både brukeren og samfunnet ekstra lidelser og høye kostnader.

At antall misbrukere økte (eller muligens bare ble mer synlige) etter forbudet er ikke noe bevis på noe som helst annet enn at de aktuelle stoffene er avhengighetsskapende.

Jasså. Det er altså ikke et bevis på at man ikke klarte å bekjempe narkotikabruken med forbudet?

Så hvis antall misbrukere hadde blitt redusert, så hadde ikke dette vært bevis på noe som helst annet enn at de aktuelle stoffene IKKE er avhengighetsskapende? Det hadde ikke hatt noe med innføringen av loven å gjøre? Er det så å forstå?

Det er i våre dager et vanlig og akseptert prinsipp at almenfarlige stoffer reguleres i form av forbud eller begrenset tilgjengelighet, og det gjelder like mye for eksplosiver og giftstoffer som for rusmidler og legemidler som ikke gir rus. Hvorfor skal rusmidler være i en særstilling her?

Haha. Du synes det er uredelig å dra inn alkohol i legaliseringsdebatten fordi det ikke kan sammenlignes med narkotika. Og så kommer du trekkende med eksplosiver og giftstoffer. Herre, gi meg styrke…

For millionte gang, vi ønsker begrenset tilgjengelighet på rusmidlene. Vi vil ha dem regulert og under statlig kontroll. For en som klager så mye på at andre tillegger deg meninger du ikke har så er du eksepsjonelt dårlig på å gjenkjenne denne tilbøyeligheten i deg selv.

Man kan heller diskutere hvordan man skal forholde seg til de som HAR opparbeidet seg et rusproblem, i stedet for å legge til rette for at alle skal kunne gjøre det.

Alle kan opparbeide seg et rusproblem i dag, narkotika er lett tilgjengelig. Tusenvis av mennesker opparbeidet seg rusproblemer i dette landet før vi hadde narkotika her, også.

Man må gjerne diskutere hvordan man skal forholde seg til de som HAR opparbeidet seg et rusproblem, og gjerne til de som KOMMER TIL å opparbeide seg et rusproblem, og ikke minst til alle de som IKKE har opparbeidet seg et rusproblem, og til alle de som IKKE KOMMER TIL å opparbeide seg et rusproblem – med til denne diskusjonen hører selvfølgelig den økte belastningen narkotikaforbudet påfører alle disse grupperingene.

Anonymous poster hash: 75829...8f4

[waco]

Du snakker med mennesker som ikke har lest michelle alexander, the new jim crow law.

Han forstår ikke at narktokaforbudet har vært en katastorfe for enkeltmennesket og for samfunnet.

Bare det at han vil nekte mennesker å selv velge om man skal bruke narkotika og det å straffe mennesker som gjør egne valg beviser jo bare fascismen i tankegangen hans.

Flere ganger har jeg bedt ham begrense seg, og se etter andre løsninger enn straff, men likefult er det helt umulig å avvenne ham.

Narkotikabruk ble ikke forbudt inorge før i 1975 som gjorde at norge fikk moderne narkotikaproblemer.

Det som er trist og litt leit er at "#339" faktisk ønsker seg at tobakk og privat røyking også blir forbudt. Han har ingen innvendinger mot tobakksforbud.

Ikke ønsker han å snakke om straff en gang!